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We can be grateful for such a book that tackles these difficult issues
head-on and for its encouragement to probe these matters more thoroughly in the context of interdisciplinary dialogue.

Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, by J. P. Moreland.
New York, 2008. 244 pages. $133 (hardcover).
Ulrich Schmidt, Academy for Philosophy, Munich
In his book Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument, J. P.
Moreland argues that the existence of conscious beings in the universe
is evidence for the existence of God. In the first chapter, Moreland addresses naturalism, the main rival world-view opposed to theism. Strong
naturalism is the view that all particulars, all properties, all relations, and
all laws in the universe are physical. And there are no entities like mental
properties, souls, angels or God inside or outside of the universe. The
spatio-temporal universe (or universes) postulated by current science is
all there is (8–9). By contrast, weak naturalism softens the definition of
strong naturalism and accepts forms of emergent mental properties (ix,
8–9). Naturalism is committed to telling a “Grand Story,” a causal story
of how all things there are now in the universe came to be. This story
will include the Big Bang, the development of organic matter out of inorganic structures, the evolution of complex organisms and the emergence
of consciousness (6–8). The ontology of a naturalist will be a physicalist
ontology, and existence will be defined as belonging to the causal spacetime system of our universe (8–10). If we accept naturalism, then we must
either reduce consciousness to physical states (reductive physicalism)
or deny that consciousness exists (eliminative physicalism). Naturalism
faces the location problem: Naturalists allow only physical entities to
exist. So they have the problem of what to do with entities like semantic
content, mind, consciousness, qualia, and agency. Where should they be
located? The naturalist faces the tough task of locating them somewhere
in the mereological hierarchy which naturalists usually accept.
In naturalism, the ground level of the hierarchy consists of elementary
particles. At higher levels there are sub-atomic parts, atoms, molecules,
cells and living organisms. These entities are constituted by the elementary
particles. Their properties and their behavior can be entirely explained in
terms of the properties and behavior of the elementary particles. They
can be reduced to the elementary particles. The relation between individuals at level n and individuals at level n + 1 is the part-whole-relation.
Cells are parts of living organisms. Molecules are parts of cells. Atoms
are parts of molecules. Sub-atomic parts like protons and neutrons are
parts of atoms. Elementary particles like up-quarks and down-quarks are
parts of sub-atomic parts (10–15). An emergent property is a unique new
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kind of property different from the properties at the subvenient base level
of the emergent property. For example, the feeling of pain is new and
different from all the chemical properties of the underlying brain state
(15). A structural property is a property that is constituted by the parts,
properties, relations and events at the subvenient level. It is not a new
kind of property. Rather it is a new configuration of the entities at the subvenient level. A structural property is necessarily caused by the properties
at the lower level. A structural property can be causally and ontologically
reduced to the properties at the lower level (15). The mass of a stone is
an example of a structural property. It can be reduced to the sum of the
masses of the elementary particles the stone consists of. Structural properties can easily be located in the naturalistic mereological hierarchy. By
contrast, emergent properties like conscious qualia cannot. This is so
because the naturalist wants to keep the causal closure of the physical
domain. But it is obvious to us from introspection that mental states, by
force of their qualia, are causal factors in our behavior. Joy causes us to
smile. Pain causes us to sigh (16–18).
In chapter 2, Moreland presents the Knowledge Argument for the conclusion that conscious properties are mental properties and not physical
properties (39–45). Mary is a neuroscientist. She knows everything scientific there is to know about perception. But she has been in a black-andwhite room all her life. She has always lacked the experience of seeing a
color. She does not know what it is like to see a red apple. Assume that she
now leaves her black-and-white room. Then she learns something new.
She acquires knowledge by acquaintance. She learns what it is like to see
a red apple. Therefore, mental properties are not physical properties. For
Mary knew all physical properties there are about perception. But she still
did not know all the properties that are involved in perception. She did not
know the mental property what it is like to see a red object. Since property
dualism is true, the naturalist cannot hold her view by being an eliminative
physicalist. Thus only the option of reductive physicalism remains. Can
physicalism and naturalism explain the existence of consciousness? The
Knowledge Argument moves from the fact that physical properties do not
exhaust all properties involved in perception to the conclusion that there
are non-physical mental properties. Here is another line of argument for
the same conclusion: Physical properties have entirely different characteristics (spatially extended, measurable, observable, many are composed of
parts) than mental properties (non-spatial, not observable by perception,
privileged private access by introspection, simple entities). Therefore, by
Leibniz’s Law of the Identity of Indiscernible Entities, physical properties
are not identical with mental properties. Moreland presents the Theistic
Argument from Consciousness as an inference to the best explanation
(32), as a Bayesian argument (32–37), and as a deductive argument (37–51).
The main line of thinking is this:
(1) The existence of conscious beings in the universe cannot be explained by naturalism. (Premise 1)
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(2) The existence of conscious beings in the universe can be explained
by theism. (Premise 2)
(3) Therefore, conscious beings in the universe are evidence for theism
and no evidence for naturalism. (conclusion)
Premise 1 is true because the existence of conscious beings in the universe
is not natural, but rather ad hoc for naturalism (29–30). Consciousness is
not natural for naturalism, because it does not bear relevant similarity to
the core entities of naturalism which are the elementary particles, the four
fundamental forces and the initial parameters of the universe. It is ad hoc,
because consciousness is not at home in naturalism, but it is at home in
the rival world view theism. For theists, the fundamental entity, God, is a
conscious being. So consciousness is a property at the fundamental level
of reality. Premise 2 is true because the fundamental assumption of theism
is that God exists and is a conscious being. He can create a universe with
conscious beings in it and it is reasonable to assume that God so wills. The
conclusion follows by the principle of theory confirmation. If a theory can
explain the existence of x, then the existence of x is evidence for the theory.
And if there is some x, then it confirms a theory, if the theory can explain
the existence of x.
In chapters 3–7, Moreland shows in detail why the views opposed to
theistic dualism cannot explain the existence of consciousness. Moreland
criticizes three naturalistic approaches, panpsychism, and pluralistic
emergentist monism. John Searle claims all the naturalist needs to do
in order to explain consciousness is to provide contingent correlations
between mental and physical states (53). In contrast, Moreland claims
with Thomas Nagel that a contingent explanation of consciousness is not
enough (58). Contingent correlations do not explain why mental properties emerge in organisms. The hard problem of consciousness is not why
physical states are correlated with mental states, but why mental properties emerge at all. It could have been the case that organisms are not conscious. According to the Grand Story of the naturalist several billion years
passed after the Big Bang without a conscious being in the universe. Why
did consciousness emerge? Physics, chemistry, biology and neurology in
principle cannot explain that, because their explanations only involve the
pushing and pulling between atoms, molecules and neurons. The nature
of consciousness is different from that.
Timothy O’Connor argues that the naturalist must explain why physical states necessarily cause mental states. Moreland agrees with this.
O’Connor defends the view that agent causation can be accepted by the
naturalist. Moreland disagrees with this (70–71). Agent causation is inconsistent with or at least difficult to harmonize with naturalism. This is so,
because the only causation known in physics is the passive liabilities of
physical objects. By contrast, we know by introspection that agent causation is an uncaused activity performed by an agent with intentions and
reasons.
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Colin McGinn claims that all naturalist attempts to explain the mental fail
for in-principle reasons. McGinn offers a mysterian naturalist solution to the
phenomenon of consciousness (95–98). He claims that there is no knowable
solution to the origin of consciousness and the correlations between mental
and physical entities. McGinn is a property dualist and rejects naturalistic
accounts of consciousness. For they cannot fulfill the necessitation requirement of providing an explanation why necessarily mental entities had to
emerge. According to McGinn, a solution to the problem of consciousness
would imply the existence of three properties: (i) There must be some properties of matter that produce consciousness. (ii) There must be properties of
the brain that unleash the properties of (i). (iii) Consciousness must have a
hidden essence (98). Moreland criticizes McGinn mainly for two reasons.
First, McGinn does not solve the problem of consciousness. McGinn only
relocates the problem of consciousness into his three postulated properties
(110). Second, it is not clear that McGinn’s view is a version of naturalism.
McGinn’s three postulated properties cannot be known empirically. Nor are
they similar to the rest of the naturalist’s ontology. Hence it is vacuous to
call these properties “naturalistic” (109–110).
David Skrbina advocates a version of panpsychism, according to which
every object has singular and unified experiences for itself and every system of mass/energy counts as such an object. The universe as a whole has
a mind, a world-soul (116–117). Moreland shows that some of Skrbina’s
arguments for panpsychism in fact favor theistic dualism over panpsychism and naturalism. This is so with the Argument from Design. The
assumption of a designer outside of the physical objects can explain the
internal structure of physical objects better than the assumption of mental
properties inside the physical objects. For it is easier for a mind outside of
a structure to give it law-like behavior, beauty and complexity than it is
for many minds inside the physical objects (125–126). Beyond that, Moreland argues against panpsychism. In the Argument from Inconclusive
Analogy, Moreland argues that the analogy between human beings and
other objects is groundless. Therefore, panpsychism is groundless (127).
In the No Signs Objection, Moreland argues that panpsychism predicts no
empirical facts. Therefore, panpsychism cannot be tested and cannot be
confirmed (127–128).
The final view Moreland addresses is Philip Clayton’s view of pluralistic emergentist monism. Clayton’s view is a form of monism, since Clayton
claims that reality is one stuff. But Clayton’s view is not a form of physicalism, since Clayton claims that physics is not enough to describe reality.
According to Clayton, many emergent properties—emergent physical,
chemical, neurological, biological, mental properties and so on—have
arisen out of physical entities during evolution. The emergence of consciousness is no special case of emergence. Clayton rejects naturalism in
favor of theistic dualism, because naturalism cannot answer why there is
anything at all, why there are ethical obligations, why there are religious
experiences and why human beings long for purpose and meaning in life.
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So Clayton’s view is a theistic view like Moreland’s (135–139). Moreland
argues that theistic dualism should be favored over Clayton’s theistic pluralistic emergentist monism. One should not practice a shopping-list approach to metaphysics as Clayton does (140). Rather, one should reduce
all emergent physical, chemical, neurological, and biological properties to
the fundamental physical entities. These entities can be reduced, because
they in fact are structural properties and not emergent properties. But
mental entities cannot be reduced, because of their new kind of properties
and their new causal powers. Thus Moreland advocates theistic dualism.
In the chapters 3–7, Moreland has argued that property dualism is superior to the other explanations of consciousness. In chapter 8, Moreland
deals with the main objection to property dualism. It is the claim that dualism is anti-scientific. Moreland is convinced of the autonomy of philosophy
(159–160). He assumes the central questions of philosophy and philosophy
of mind can be answered only by philosophical reasoning, investigation
and argument. The answers to these questions do not rely on science. The
central questions of philosophy are autonomous with respect to science,
because they are to a great extent unrelated to the hard sciences.
If a philosophical question is autonomous with respect to the hard
sciences, it must be evaluated from case to case. The hard sciences have
“almost no bearing on the nature of consciousness” (157). This is so, because even if we have evidence of the dependence of mental faculties on
the brain, this is not sufficient reason to attribute these mental faculties to
the brain rather than the soul. It is not natural to attribute mental faculties to the brain, because all the other properties of brains we know—for
example, by neuroscience—are very different from mental faculties. Correlations between mental and physical properties are the most the hard sciences can deliver on the topic of consciousness. Even if we have evidence of
many correlations between mental and physical properties, this leaves the
philosophical possibilities open. Mental and physical properties could be
identical, mental properties could cause physical properties or vice versa or
in both directions. Mental properties could supervene on physical properties or vice versa. Or there could be no causal relations and no dependence
relations between mental and physical properties, but just parallelism.
Therefore, in spite of the progress of biology, neuroscience and cognitive
science, the nature of conscious human beings is a philosophical question.
So property dualism is superior to alternative views of consciousness. This
is step 1 of the Theistic Argument from Consciousness (156):
(1) The existence of consciousness is best explained by property dualism.
(2) Property dualism is best explained by theism.
Step 2 of the argument is this: We now assume that mental properties
exist. They are new kinds of properties compared to physical properties
and they exhibit new causal powers. Mental states cannot emerge from
physical states. For what is possible during evolution is only that new
physicalstructures emerge by rearrangement of the physical elementary

122

Faith and Philosophy

particles. But one cannot see how properties of an entirely novel kind can
emerge. If we assume theism, by contrast, then God as the conscious fundamental being can have created the finite mental entities in the universe.
In chapter 9 Moreland addresses the question why so many philosophers are physicalists in spite of the lack of evidence for physicalism.
Moreland assumes that it is not rational arguments that drive many philosophers towards physicalism and naturalism. Rather, it is the climate
in universities and it is fear of God (176–177). But from the perspective of
Christian Theism, since God is merciful and benevolent, we do not have
to fear God. Rather, since only God gives us forgiveness and eternal life as
a gift, the only thing we have to fear is losing our relationship with God
(Matthew 10:28–31).
J. P. Moreland’s book is a must-read for everyone interested in theistic arguments. It is also a valuable source of information about different
views in the philosophy of mind. In my view, Moreland has made a very
strong and convincing case for the existence of God based on the existence of finite consciousness. He has presented and criticized five different
views on the mind-body relation in detail. The failure of these views and
the Knowledge Argument, which Moreland presents with brilliant clarity,
show why at least property dualism is the best view to accept. Property
dualism in turn is much better explained by theism than by naturalism.
There are two ways in which Moreland’s project could be expanded. First,
one could present even more views on the mind-body relation and show
that they are inferior to property dualism. Second, one could present more
positive reasons besides the Knowledge Argument for the conclusion
that mind-body dualism is true—for example, the Zombie Arguments by
David Chalmers or the arguments by Alvin Plantinga in “Against Materialism.” Overall, Moreland’s Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument is the best publication available on the relation between God
and finite conscious beings.

